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JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
pursuant to U.C.A. Section 78-2-2(3) (j) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
I.

Did the Trial Court err in ruling that the acts of
defendants James and Asay were not the proximate cause of
the pursuit or the collision?

II.

Do Utah Code Sections 63-30-7(2) (amended 1990 and repealed
1991) and 63-30-10(15) provide immunity for defendants?

III. Are these defendants immune pursuant to the discretionary
function exception to the waiver of immunity found in
§3-30-10(1), Utah Code Ann.?
These defendants adopt by reference the standards of
appellate review as set forth in Plaintiff's brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
These defendants adopt Plaintiff's Statement of the Case
with the exception of Plaintiff's characterization of- Brad James
and Ed Asay as pursuing police officers.
support this statement.
Patrolman Ken Colyar.

There is no evidence to

The only pursuing officer was Highway

Officers Brad James and Ed Asay simply

fell in behind Colyar and followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants adopt Plaintiffs Statement of Facts with the
following additions and exceptions:
When Steven Floyd first saw Utah Highway patrolman Ken
Colyar in his marked patrol car near the North Santaquin exit, he

panicked because he was in a stolen car and did not have a
driver's license.

R. 1029, 1033, 1095-1097 (Floyd deposition,

pp. 39, 43, 105-107)
Colyar initially decided to pursue the Floyd vehicle because
it was speeding, had tinted windows, no front license plate, and
a young driver.

Trooper Colyar was suspicious that the vehicle

might have been stolen, or being used to transport contraband.
Colyar decided, within a short distance up State Road 6, that
Floyd was also guilty of felony evading, that is, fleeing a
police officer and going more than 40 miles an hour over the
posted speed limit.
R. 652-655

(Colyar deposition, Vol. I pp. 78-82)

The first officer to become involved, other than Trooper
Colyar, was Officer Mellin of the Payson City Police Department.
Mellin was driving a fully marked Chevrolet Caprice police car
with overhead lights operating, and was sitting at a downtown
intersection.

Floyd went around the Payson police car, and

continued on toward Salem, with Colyar close behind.

Colyar

assumes that Mellin fell in somewhere behind, but doesn't know
for sure.

R. 944-948 (Colyar deposition Vol. II. pp. 67-71)

Floyd describes the first city police car that he saw as
being marked, with lights and sirens on, and either white, lightblue or gray.

That car pulled out like it was attempting to get

in Floyd's way; Floyd went around it with no problem, and as he
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went around, the Highway Patrol car was still right on his
bumper.

R. 1103-1104 (Floyd deposition pp. 113-114)

After going around the Payson vehicle, neither Floyd nor
Colyar ever saw it again.

R. 1049, 1106; (Floyd deposition pp.

59, 116) R. 681-682 (Colyar deposition Vol. I pp. 108-109)
The pursuit continued on to Salem, at which time Officer
Brad James, driving a marked white Ford LTD police car, tried to
get in Floyd's way.

Again, Floyd simply went around him, with

Trooper Colyar close behind.

James's police car had its overhead

lights on, and was going in the same direction.

Floyd and Colyar

passed James's police car on the left, and continued on their
way.

R. 699-701 (Colyar deposition Vol. I pp. 126-128)

952 (Colyar deposition Vol. II pp. 72-75)

R. 949-

Colyar believes that

James fell in behind them, but doesn't know for sure, and never
saw James in his rear view mirror.

R. 953 (Colyar deposition

Vol. II p. 76)
In Spanish Fork, Officer Ed Asay placed his marked Chevrolet
sedan police vehicle at the intersection of Highway 6 and 400
South with his overhead lights on.

He pulled out into the lane

in which Floyd was traveling, but Floyd merely changed lanes and
went around Asay's police car, as did Colyar.

R. 790-791;

(Colyar deposition Vol. I pp. 216-217); R. 967 (Colyar deposition
Vol. II p. 90)

Colyar never saw the Asay police vehicle again

prior to the accident.

R. 968 (Colyar deposition Vol. II p. 91)
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Floyd's testimony is somewhat unclear and inconsistent with
Colyar's.

He recalls seeing the first police car in the vicinity

of the first town, presumably Payson, and remembers seeing some
additional police cars, perhaps two, in the next town.

The cars

were along the side of the road with their lights and sirens
going, as if they were trying to get him to stop.
past or around them and did not see them again.
(Floyd deposition pp. 65-66).

He simply went

R. 1055-1056

He describes the other encounters:

Q.

Let's just be clear here. Trooper Colyar starts the
pursuit. It's just you and him. Then this
first police car pulls out; you go around it.
Colyar goes around it and the chase
continues. Did you ever see the first police
car again, to your knowledge?

A.

Not to my knowledge.

Q.

Then you go into one of these other towns and these two
other police cars appear, do whatever it is
they do, apparently try to get you to stop?

A.

Un-huh (yes).

Q.

They've got their lights and sirens going?
•

*

*

A.

Yes, yes, sorry.

Q.

And again, you go around them?

A.

Yes.

Q.

With no particular problem?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And Trooper Colyar again is right behind you, right?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

And as I understand your testimony, you never saw those
two cars again before the accident?

A.

That's correct.

R. 1106-1107 (Floyd deposition pp. 116-117)
On 1-15 from the North Spanish Fork on-ramp to the
University Avenue exit in Provo, Colyar did not see any of the
city police cars behind him.

From what he heard on the radio, he

believed Asay and James had backed off somewhere back around
Springville.

R. 968-969 (Colyar deposition Vol. II pp. 91-92)

After Floyd got back onto the freeway, the only police cars
he saw were Colyar's patrol car and a white Bronco with flashing
lights either behind or to the side of Trooper Colyar.
Bronco was a Utah County Sheriffs vehicle.

The white

R. 1070-1073 (Floyd

deposition pp. 80-83) R. 915 (Colyar deposition Vol. II p. 38)
The only police car that Floyd ever observed pursuing him,
other than Trooper Colyar in the Highway Patrol car, was the
white Bronco, which he only saw after he reentered the freeway at
Spanish Fork.

R. 1059, 1070 (Floyd deposition pp. 69, 80)

It was Floyd's intention during the entire pursuit to evade
the Highway Patrolman.

Regardless of Floyd's speed, the Highway

Patrol car was always right behind him.

It was Floyd's intent to

drive as fast as he could, so long as the Highway Patrolman was
in sight, and it didn't make any difference how many other police
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vehicles were involved.

Floyd's testimony is clear that, after

he passed them, he did not know whether the Salem and Spanish
Fork police officers were in any way involved in the pursuit.
R. 1106-1107 (Floyd deposition pp. 116-117)

Their sole

involvement was to make their presence known, but Floyd and
Colyar would simply go around them, leaving them, perhaps, to
simply fall in behind.
Q.

So it was your intention during the entire pursuit from
when the Highway Patrolman first turned around and
started to follow you, in the vicinity of Santaquin, it
was your intention to get away from him to where he
could see you, could see the car, and you were going to
abandon the car and head off on foot, correct?

A.

Yes. R. 1113 (Floyd deposition p. 123)
* * *

Q,

All right. So it was always your intent to leave the
Highway Patrol car and other than a brief moment as you
entered the on-ramp and had your problem with the semi,
he was always right on your bumper?

A.

Yes.

Q.

I mean not literally, but somewhere within --

A,

Two to three car lengths.

Q.

Somewhere between a hundred yards or a car length or
two?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And regardless of whether he was one car length behind
you or 200 yards, if he was ever that far, your traffic
and driving pattern was the same, that is, you went as
fast as that Buick would take you so long as you could
negotiate the traffic?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

And it wouldn't make any difference to you whether it
was just the Highway Patrol car behind you, or whether
you had five police cars lined up behind the Highway
Patrol car; is not that true?

A.

Yes. R. 1114-1115 (Floyd deposition pp. 124-125)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
***

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DECIDED THAT THE
ACTS OF DEFENDANTS SALEM CITY CORPORATION,
BRAD JAMES, SPANISH FORK CITY CORPORATION AND
ED ASAY WERE NOT THE CAUSE, PROXIMATE OR
OTHERWISE, OF THE PURSUIT OR THE COLLISION.
Plaintiff argues that negligence and proximate cause issues
are factual and should not be resolved as a matter of law.

But

in Apache Tank Lines, Inc. v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah
1985) this Court said that while issues of negligence ordinarily
present questions of fact to be resolved by the fact finder, when
the facts are undisputed and but one reasonable conclusion can be
drawn therefrom, such issues become questions of law.
Likewise, in Jensen v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 611
P.2d 363 (Utah 1980), cited by plaintiff, this Court recognized
that in appropriate circumstances summary judgment may be granted
on the issue of proximate cause:
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We recognize at the outset that in appropriate
circumstances summary judgment may be granted on the
issue of proximate cause. Id. at 365
This Court went on to say, however, that in a situation
involving independent intervening cause, the primary issue is one
of the foreseeability of the subsequent negligent conduct of a
third person, and in such a case the issue must be resolved by
the finder of fact.
This, however, is not such a case.

Plaintiff suggests that

in this case, one of the critical issues is whether the conduct
of the fleeing driver constitutes an independent intervening
cause which excuses the conduct of Trooper Colyar and/or Officers
James and Asay as a proximate cause of the accident in question,
suggesting of course that it does not; and further suggesting
that the acts of the fleeing suspect and of all defendants were
"co-proximate causes" of the pursuit and the collision.
In cases involving independent, intervening cause, the
primary issue is one of foreseeability of the subsequent
negligent conduct of a third person.

Where there is no causation

in fact, however, the issue of foreseeability never arises.
The standard definition of "proximate cause" is "that cause
which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred."

The two elements of

proximate cause are cause-in-fact and foreseeability.
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This Court

noted the essential elements of a negligence action in Williams
v. Melby. 699 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1985):
(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by the
defendant to plaintiff; (2) a breach of that
duty; (3) the causation, both actually and
proximately, of injury; and (4) the suffering
of damages by the plaintiff.
In determining whether there is causation "in fact", many
courts use the "but for" test.

That test is, simply, whether

"but for the defendant's conduct, the event would not have
occurred, or conversely, that the defendant's conduct is not the
cause of the event if the event would have occurred without the
defendant's conduct."

See, e.g., Young v. Flathead County. 757

P.2d 772 (Mont. 1988).
If we assume, contrary to the evidence, that the acts of
James and Asay concurred in some fashion with those of Trooper
Colyar to bring about the ultimate event, then it would be proper
to apply the "substantial factor" test.

That test may be stated:

the defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a
material element and a substantial factor in bringing it about.
The 'substantial factor' formulation is one
concerning legal significance rather than
factual quantum. Such a formulation, which
can scarcely be called a test, is an
improvement over the 'but for' rule for this
special class of cases. It aids in the
disposition of these cases and likewise of
two other types of situations which have
proved troublesome. One is that where a
similar, but not identical, result would have
followed without the defendant's act; the
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other where one defendant has made a clearly
proved but quite insignificant contribution
to the result, as where he throws a lighted
match into a forest fire. In the great
majority of cases it produces the same legal
conclusion as the but for test. Except in
the classes of cases indicated, no case has
been found where the defendant's act could be
called a substantial factor when the event
would have occurred without it; nor will
cases very often arise where it would not be
such a factor when it was so indispensable a
cause that without it the result would not
have followed.
Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th Ed., pp. 267-268.
Under either test, it is clear that the acts of James and
Asay were not the "cause in fact" of the collision.

Plaintiff

cannot meet her burden of showing that the conduct of these
defendants was a substantial causative factor that led to the
ultimate accident.
There is no evidence that anything that either Officer James
or Officer Asay did was the cause-in-fact of Floyd's reckless
driving and the resulting collision.

While they made their

presence known, it is undisputed that Floyd easily avoided both
Officer James and Officer Asay, continuing on his way, driving as
fast as he could, and that he would continue to do so as long as
Trooper Colyar was in sight, which he always was.
There is no evidence that the acts of Officers James and
Asay caused Floyd to speed up, slow down, change his route, or
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otherwise influence his behavior or his driving pattern in any
respect whatsoever.

Once Floyd passed Officers James and Asay,

he did not ever see their police cars again prior to the
accident.

Thus, there is simply no causal relationship between

the acts of Officers James and Asay and the ultimate collision.
"When the proximate cause of an injury is left to
speculation, the claim fails as a matter of law."

Mitchell v.

Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240, 246 (Utah 1985).

The facts of

this case do not leave even the slightest room for speculation as
to causation.

Reasonable minds cannot differ as to the certainty

that the pursuit would have continued, and the collision
occurred, regardless of the involvement of Officers James and
Asay.

Since the accident would have occurred in any event, the

first element of proximate cause, that is, "cause in fact," is
not present.
The second element of proximate cause, foreseeability, has
no application to these facts.

In this case, Floyd's negligent

conduct did not commence subsequent to the conduct of these
defendants.

Floyd's negligent conduct was a continuing activity

which began before and continued after the involvement of these
defendants.

The subsequent negligent conduct necessarily

required to be foreseen by these defendants is Floyd's continued
efforts to flee and elude these defendants.

Floyd has testified

that he was not fleeing these defendants at the time of the
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accident.

He could not have been because he was not even aware

of their participation in the continuing pursuit.

Thus, the

actions of these defendants did not influence Floyd and
independent intervening cause is therefore not at issue.
In Ducote v. Jackson, 542 So.2d 689 (La. 1989), the
plaintiffs' vehicle was hit by a fleeing criminal suspect who was
being chased by city police.

State troopers received a radio

call that city police were involved in a chase and fell in
behind, but were never advised of the reason for the chase.
Plaintiffs brought a negligence action against the state
troopers, who were granted summary judgment. On appeal, the court
rejected the claim that plaintiffs probably would not have been
involved in the accident but for the fact that the state troopers
joined in the chase.

In affirming summary judgment for the state

troopers, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana held:
We cannot conclude that Mr. and Mrs.
Ducote probably would not have been involved
in the accident but for the fact that the
troopers joined the chase. The troopers'
actions were not a substantial factor in
causing the accident. The troopers' conduct
was not the antecedent without which the
accident would not have occurred. Their
actions were not the cause in fact of the
accident. Without causation there can be no
liability.
542 So.2d at 690,691.
Plaintiff cites Brown v. Pinellas Park, 557 So.2d 161 (Fla.
App.2 Dist. 1990), for the proposition that a question of fact
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exists as to whether all officers involved in a pursuit should
bear responsibility for the consequences of the continued
pursuit.
Brown is distinguishable from the facts of this case.
ultimately involved fifteen officers in active pursuit.
court described the entourage as a speeding caravan.

Brown

The

An order to

terminate the pursuit had been given and was disregarded.
In this case, neither the Salem City officer nor the Spanish
Fork officer initiated the chase. Neither officer was ever in a
position as the primary unit in the pursuit.
speeding caravan.

There was no

Highway Patrol Officer Colyar continued the

pursuit as the primary unit without regard to participation, or
lack thereof, from other officers.

Furthermore, Floyd was not

aware that any city police officer had fallen in behind Trooper
Colyar.

He never again saw either officer after passing through

their individual towns, and each time he looked back,' it was only
Trooper Colyar that he saw.
Floyd must have known the city officers were pursuing him
before their conduct could have influenced his conduct.
Plaintiff did not, and cannot, establish one of the key elements
of a negligence cause of action, that is, causation in fact.
Even assuming cause-in-fact, neither the acts of James nor
the acts of Asay were a "proximate cause" of the collision.
Proximate cause is the limitation which the courts have placed
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upon the actor's responsibility for the consequences of his
conduct whether because of the application of notions of
foreseeability, public policy, or mere common sense.
Where the officer is in a non-contact vehicle many courts
have held as a matter of law that the fleeing suspect's conduct
is the sole proximate cause; that officers are not to be made
insurers of the conduct of the culprits they chase; that officers
are not obliged to allow offenders to escape and would, in fact,
be derelict in their duty if they did not pursue offenders. See,
e.g., Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589 (Ky 1952);
Paaels v. San Francisco, 135 Cal.App.2d 152, 286 P.2d 877 (1st
Dist. 1955); Wrubel v. Tate of New York, 174 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1958);
Miami v. Home, 198 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1967); Roll v. Timberman, 94
N.J.Super. 530, 229 A.2d 281 (1967); Downs v. Camp, 113
Ill.App.2d 221, 252 N.E.2d 46 (1969); Reenders v., Ontario, 68
Cal.App.3d 1045, 137 Cal. Rptr. 736 (4th Dist. 1977); Fiser v.
Ann Arbor, 107 Mich.App. 367, 309 N.W.2d 552, App.Gr. (Mich), 316
N.W.2d 916 (1981); Thornton v. Shore, 233 Kan. 737, 666 P.2d 655
(1983); DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Who. 1986); Oberkramer v.
City of Ellisville, 706 S.W.2d 440 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Baidy v.
Marah, 760 S.W.2d 195 (Mo.Ct.App. 1988); Doran v. City of
Madison, 519 So.2d 1308 (Ala. 1988); Kennedy v. City of Spring
City, 780 S.W.2d 164 (Tenn. 1989).
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In DeWald, supra, an action was brought against the State of
Wyoming and state highway patrol officers for the death of the
driver of a vehicle stopped at a red light who was struck by a
drunk driving suspect who had been fleeing from patrol officers.
The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment for the
State and the officers, holding that:
When a police officer pursues a fleeing
violator and the violator injures a third
party as a result of the chase, the officer's
pursuit is not the proximate cause of those
injuries unless the circumstances indicate
extreme or outrageous conduct by the officer.
To put it another way, the possibility that
the violator will injure a third party is too
remote to create liability until the conduct
of the officer becomes extreme.
719 P.2d at 650.
In so holding, the Wyoming Supreme Court cited and
specifically stated that it agreed with the analysis and holdings
of Roll, supra, Chambers. supra. Reenders, supra, City of Miami,
supra, and Thornton, supra.:
[T]he majority view expressed in other
jurisdictions in similar cases holds that the
police officer is not liable. The reasoning
which underlies the rejection of liability in
these cases is two-fold: (1) it is the duty
of a police officer to apprehend those whose
reckless driving makes use of the highway
dangerous to others; (2) the proximate cause
of the accident is the reckless driving of
the pursued, notwithstanding recognition of
the fact that the police pursuit contributed
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to the pursued's reckless driving.
(Citations omitted)
719 P.2d at 649, citing Roll, supra, at 284.
In Doran, supra, occupants of a vehicle with which a pursued
vehicle collided brought an action against the police officers
and the city for injuries sustained in the collision.

The court

conceded that '[t]here can be little doubt that the high speed
pursuit by the police officers contributed to [the suspect's]
reckless driving. . .", but held that the actions of the driver
of the pursued vehicle were the proximate cause of the injuries.
Some jurisdictions hold that since there can be more than
one cause of an occurrence, it is foreseeable that a police
officer's pursuit could be a proximate cause of an injury to a
third party injured by the pursued suspect, but no court which
has held the conduct of a back-up or lagging officer, not
actively involved in the pursuit, to be a proximate cause of a
third party's injury.

The facts of this case make it impossible

for the actions of the officers from Spanish Fork and Salem City
to be a proximate cause of Mr. Day's death.

Their actions were

far too remote and the trial court appropriately so ruled.
Plaintiff points out to the Court that the depositions of
Trooper Ken Colyar and fleeing suspect Steven Floyd constitute
the only discovery which has been undertaken in the instant case.
She argues that summary judgment must not be granted if discovery
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is incomplete, since information sought in discovery may create
genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion.
However, plaintiff filed no Rule 56(f) motion and made no other
record that the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should
have been delayed to allow for further discovery.
In any event, plaintiff's rationale ignores the underlying
elements of causation.

Further discovery will not divulge any

information which will create a genuine issue as to causation.
Floyd must have known the city officers were pursuing him before
their conduct could have influenced his conduct, and he has
testified that he did not.
Under the best of circumstances, plaintiff's depositions of
the city officers may elicit an admission of intent to engage in
the pursuit until the bitter end.

The intent of the city

officers, however, is not controlling.

The actions of Floyd were

not affected by anything the city officers did.

He was

completely unaware of their involvement and his behavior was not
influenced by their involvement --or lack of involvement.
POINT II.
DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT BY VIRTUE OF
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 63-30-7(2)
(AMENDED 1990 AND REPEALED 1991)
Utah Code Ann. Section 63-30-7(2) provides blanket immunity
to these defendants "for civil damages for personal injury or
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death or for damage to property resulting from the collision of a
vehicle being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the
law who is being, has been, or believes he is being or has been
pursued by a peace officer. . . . "
Plaintiff's cause of action arose on the date of the
accident, March 18, 1991. A tort cause of action accrues when it
becomes remediable in the courts. Davidson Lumber v. Bonneville
Investment, Inc.. 794 P.2d 11, 19 (Utah 1990).

Plaintiff

suggests that her cause of action became remediable in the courts
on August 21, 1991, more than five months after the accident from
which she claims injury, reasoning that a notice of claim is a
precondition to suit and must be submitted within one year after
the injury producing incident.

Such claim is deemed denied 90

days after submission, at which time the claimant may commence an
action against a government entity or employee.
Plaintiff filed her notice of claim on May 27, 1991, and it
was deemed denied on August 21, 1991. According to plaintiff's
reasoning, she could not commence this lawsuit before her claim
was denied, and thus her cause of action became remediable in the
courts only after the August 21, 1991 denial.

It is on that date

that she contends her cause of action accrued.
The Immunity Act does not distinguish between accrual of a
claim and accrual of a cause of action.
interchangeably.

The two are used

A "claim" is defined as "any claim or cause of
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action for money or damages . . .."
supplied).

§63-30-2(2) (emphasis

Therefore, the Act does not contain different rules

for determining when a "claim" arises and when a "cause of
action" arises.
Plaintiff's contention is also contrary to the express
intent of the Legislature.

In repealing §63-30-7, it stated:

Section II. Informational Section. This
prospective effect only and any changes to the
this act do not apply to any claims based upon
losses that occurred before the effective date
L. 1991, Ch. 76, §11 (Addendum A).

act has
law caused by
injuries or
of this act.

The Legislature expressly

stated that the repeal of §63-30-7(2) did not affect claims for
injuries that occurred before repeal.

In this case, plaintiff's

injuries occurred before repeal, so she cannot contend that §6330-7(2) is inapplicable.

This provision of the Utah Governmental

Immunity act was in effect at the time plaintiff's cause of
action arose and is the controlling law for this case, barring
plaintiff's cause of action.
Plaintiff also claims that Utah Code Ann. §63-30-7(2)
violates the open courts provisions, the equal protection
provisions, and the due process provisions of the Utah
Constitution, and thus is not controlling.
A.

SECTION 63-30-7(2) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE OPEN COURTS CLAUSE
Utah's open courts clause permits the Utah Legislature to

abrogate an existing remedy if one of two standards is satisfied.
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First, there must be an "effective and reasonable alternative
remedy" that is "substantially equal in value" to the eliminated
remedy.

Berry v. Beech Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).

Second, in the absence of an alternative remedy, the abrogation
stands only if (a) "there is a clear social or economic evil to
be eliminated," and (b) the abrogation is not "an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective."

Id.

Plaintiff contends that §63-30-7(2) eliminates an otherwise
existing remedy at common law.

She cites no authority for the

proposition that she had a remedy at common law that was
eliminated by §63-30-7(2).
An essential element of a claim for negligence is an
actionable duty of care owned by a defendant to a particular
plaintiff.

Weber v. Sprinaville City. 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah

19 86) . The existence of a legal duty is a question of law to be
determined by the court.

Id.

Utah's Supreme Court has on two occasions addressed the
issue of whether law enforcement officers owed actionable legal
duties to enforce Utah's laws.

In Obray v. Malmberg. 26 Utah 2d

17, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971) the Court held that a sheriff had no
actionable duty to investigate a burglary.

In Christensen v.

Hayward. 694 P.2d 612, 613 (Utah 1989) the Court held that a
deputy had no duty to arrest a person who appeared to be
attempting to operate a motorcycle while drunk.
-20-

No Utah

appellate court has addressed the converse issue of whether a law
enforcement officer has a duty not to enforce the law in certain
circumstances.
While there is no actionable duty to enforce the law, once
an officer undertakes to enforce a law, reasonable care is
required.
The Utah Supreme Court has construed §41-6-14 to impose an
actionable duty on emergency vehicle operators.

See e.g. Howe v.

Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159, 161 (1966).

No Utah

appellate court has held that this duty extends to persons who
are injured by violators of the law who are attempting to elude
emergency vehicles.

All Utah decisions that construe §41-6-14

involve a collision between the operator of an emergency vehicle
and another car.
In Thornton v. Shore, 666 P.2d 655 (Kan. 1983), the Kansas
court addressed the issue of whether a duty similar to that
articulated in §41-6-14 extends to people injured by fleeing
felons.

The case involved a police pursuit of a speeder who

refused to stop.

Id. at 657. During the pursuit, the speeder

committed other violations of the law including reckless driving,
attempting to elude an officer, speeding, and running stop signs.
Id.

The pursuit ended when the speeder ran a stop sign and

collided with another car.

Two occupants of the other car were

killed, and the father of one decedent sued the pursuing police
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officer.

Id. at 658. The officer was granted summary judgment.

On appeal, the issue was whether the officer had liability under
K.S.A. 8-1506, statute that parallels Utah Code Ann. §41-6-14.
(Addendum B ) .
The appellant's argument on appeal was that the officer had
an actionable duty to abandon the continued pursuit of fleeing
violators who engage in "extreme recklessness."

Id. at 659.

This contention was based on K.S.A. 8-1506 which granted certain
immunities to emergency vehicle drivers but nevertheless required
them to "drive with due regard for the safety of all persons
using the highway," and did not immunize them from "reckless
disregard for the safety of others."

Id.

The Supreme Court of Kansas rejected appellant's contention,
holding that the officer had no duty to the decedent.

It found

that the immunities given to emergency vehicle drivers would be
"hollow" if the test of due regard in the statute "were extended
to include the acts of the fleeing motorist whom the officer is
trying to apprehend."

Id. at 661-62.

Such extension, according

to the court, would "make the officer the insurer of the fleeing
violator, be he or she a mentally deranged person, prison
escapee, murderer, drug addict or drunk."

Id. at 662.

The Thornton court went on to review decisions on the
question from other jurisdictions.
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From Kentucky's highest court

in Chambers v. Ideal Pure Milk Co., 245 S.W.2d 589, 590-91, (Ky.
1953) it quoted:
To argue that the officer's pursuit caused Shearer [the
fleeing violator] to speed may be factually true, but it
does not follow that the officers are liable at law for the
results of Shearer's negligent speed [collision with third
car]. Police cannot be made insurers of the conduct of the
culprits they chase.
The Thornton court also noted the sound policy reasons for not
extending an officer's duty to cover negligence of fleeing
motorists.

It quoted from State of West Virginia v. Fidelity &

Cas. Co. of N.Y.. 263 F.Supp. 88 (D.W. Va. 1967):
We are not prepared to hold an officer liable for
damages inflicted by the driver of a stolen vehicle whom he
was lawfully attempting to apprehend for the fortuitous
reason only that the criminal drove through an urban area.
To do so would open the door for every desperado to seek
sanctuary in the congested confines of our municipalities,
serene in the knowledge that an officer would not likely
give chase for fear of being liable for the pursued's
recklessness. Such is not now the law nor should it be law.
After reviewing decisions from across the nation, the
Thornton court adopted the "majority view" which holds that law
enforcement officers are not liable for the acts of fleeing
violators.

Id. at 662.

It specifically held that the "due

regard" requirement only applied "to the police officer's
physical operation of his own vehicle and not to the decision to
chase or continue the chase of a law violator."

Id. at 668.

Since the Thornton decision other courts have refused to
hold police liable for the recklessness of a fleeing motorist.
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See DeWald v. State. 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1983) (decision to
continue pursuit was not proximate cause of fleeing motorists'
collision with another car); Kelly v. Tulsa. 791 P.2d 826 (Okla.
App. 1990) (duty of care does not extend to decision to pursue
fleeing motorist); Dent v. City of Dallas. 729 S.W.2d 114, 117
(Tex. App. 1986) (following the "majority rule" that police
officers have no liability to third parties who are killed by
fleeing motorists).
In the present case, defendants were operating emergency
vehicles, patrol cars, at the time of the pursuit.
activated their flashing lights and sirens.

They had

They are therefore

entitled to the protections of §41-6-14.
Officers James and Asay's duties under §41-6-14 should not
extend to the negligent acts of the fleeing motorist, Steven
Floyd.

This would make them insurers of the acts of any fleeing

suspects.

It would allow any criminal to take refuge in the

midst of a populated area, assured of the fact that an officer
will not pursue because he may be held liable for the criminal's
recklessness.
The majority rule demonstrates that plaintiff does not have
a remedy at common law.

Therefore, the immunity conferred by

§63-30-7(2) does not abrogate any right of plaintiff and the open
courts clause does not apply.
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B.

PLAINTIFF'S EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE IS WITHOUT MERIT
Plaintiff claims that §63-30-7(2) violates her rights under

the equal protection clause of the Utah Constitution.

She claims

to have been singled out because she cannot sue government
defendants for her injuries, but those with claims arising before
or after the period that §63-30-7(2) was effective can do so.
This, she claims, is unequal treatment.
As noted above, plaintiff did not have a cause of action for
failure to terminate the pursuit of a fleeing motorist.
had such a cause of action.
treatment.

No one

Therefore, there is no unequal

All citizens had the same rights before, during and

after the period that §63-30-7(2) was in effect.
C.

SECTION 63-30-7(2) DOES NOT DENY DUE PROCESS
Plaintiff contends that §63-30-7(2) deprives her of a remedy

to sue government defendants for continuing the pursuit of Floyd.
This abrogates her interest in having a day in court and
therefore violates her due process rights under the Utah
Constitution.

She further contends that it is fundamentally

unfair to apply §63-30-7(2) because the bill repealing it was
approved by the Governor days before the accident.
Since plaintiff never had a remedy for defendants'
involvement in the pursuit of Floyd, there is no deprivation or
unfairness.
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POINT III.
DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT BY VIRTUE OF
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 63-30-10(15)
Assuming plaintiff's cause of action arose sometime after
the bar effectuated by §63-30-7(2), or assuming §63-30-7(2) to be
unconstitutional, defendants are immune by virtue of U.C.A. §6330-10(15).
In 1991, when 63-30-7 was repealed, Section 63-30-10(15) was
enacted, retaining immunity for the operation of an emergency
vehicle while being driven in accordance with the requirements of
Section 41-6-14.
Section 41-6-14 exempts the operator of an authorized
emergency vehicle, when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected
violator of the law, from the usual traffic laws so long as the
officer's vehicle sounds an audible signal or uses a visual
signal and the officer acts "with due regard for the safety of
all persons."
There has been no allegation by the plainti-f that Ed Asay
or Brad James violated any of the provisions of Section 41-6-14.
Specifically, there is no allegation that either James or Asay
exceeded the maximum speed limit, disregarded traffic signs or
signals, or operated without audible or visual signals.

The only

allegations against James and Asay are that they joined in the
chase at various times and for various distances.
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The officers' duties or liabilities under Section 41-6-14
should not extend to the reckless acts of a fleeing felon.

Such

an extension would make the officers and their employers insurers
of the acts of any fleeing suspects.

It would allow any criminal

to seek refuge in the midst of a populated area, assured by the
fact that an officer would not pursue because he may be held
liable for the criminal's recklessness, an unrealistic extension
of liability.
The emergency vehicle statute has been in effect in Utah, in
one form or another, since 1955; yet there is no Utah authority
which applies the emergency vehicle statute to impose liability
on a pursuing police officer for collisions between fleeing
suspects and innocent third parties.
Other jurisdictions have refused to extend liability to
pursuing police officers for the reckless acts of the suspects
they pursue, so long as the officers themselves comply with the
emergency vehicle statute.
In Thornton v. Shore, supra. the Supreme Court of Kansas
held that an officer was entitled to the privileges and
immunities granted by statute where he was operating his
authorized emergency vehicle in full compliance with the
requirements of the statute

at the time of the accident, on the

basis that the officer was not the insurer of the violator he was
pursuing.
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In Reenders v. Ontario. 68 Cal.App.3d 1045, 137 Cal. Rptr.
736 (4th Dist. 1977), the California court stated that the
emergency vehicle statute had nothing whatever to do with the
case inasmuch as plaintiff's injury was not caused by any
negligent or wrongful act or omission in the operation of any
motor vehicle by an employee the defendant city within the
meaning of the Act.

The court pointed out that the facts did not

indicate any negligent operation of the police vehicles, and that
it was not the negligent operation of those vehicles of which the
plaintiff complained, but rather that the officers were negligent
in undertaking and continuing their pursuit.

The court concluded

that considerations of public policy preponderated against the
imposition of any duty upon a municipality and its police
officers to refrain from pursuing a lawbreaker who is already
operating a vehicle on the public streets in a reckless and
dangerous manner; a reasonable and just conclusion.
POINT IV.
DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FROM SUIT BY VIRTUE OF
THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION TO THE
WAIVER OF IMMUNITY FOUND IN UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, SECTION 63-30-10(1)
These defendants adopt herein by reference the argument of
the State of Utah, contained in POINT VIII of its Brief.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court should affirm the
trial court's ruling, granting summary judgment to all
defendants.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of February, 1993.
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Allan L. Larson
Anne Swensen
Attorneys for Defendants
Salem City Corporation, Spanish
Fork City Corporation, Brad
James and Ed Asay

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct copies
of the foregoing Appellee's Brief to be mailed first class,
postage prepaid, this *2£> day of February, 1993, to:
Reed M. Stringham, III
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Larry R. Keller, Esq.
Craig L. Boorman, Esq.
LARRY R. KELLER Sc ASSOCIATES
257 East 200 South, Suite 340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

13607.163/Brief

-29-

ADDENDUM CONTENTS

Addendum A

L1991, Ch. 76 §11

Addendum B

KSA 8-1506, UCA 41-6-14

Addendum C

UCA 63-30-7(2) (amended 1990, repealed 1991)

Addendum D

UCA 63-30-10(15)

-30-

ADDENDUM A
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Ch. 76
CHAPTER 76
S.B.No.218
Passed February 27, 1991
Approved March 14. 1991
Effective April 29. 1991

j
|
j

:2> Nothing in this chapter ishall! may be coo*
strued as adversely affecting any immunity froafcvsuit i which i that a governmental entity or employ^
may otherwise assert under state or federal law^-

\

'• 3 >' a i [The remedy 1 Except as provided in Subsec*,
tion < b K an action under this chapter against a gpy^
ernmental entity or its employee for an injury caused by an act or omission [which] that occurs
during the performance of [ saeh 1 the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color
of authority is),- after the effective date of thio oet;] a
plaintiffs exclusive [ef| remedy.

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
AMENDMENTS
By Ronald J. Ockey
AN ACT RELATING TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY; CLARIFYLNG THE SCOPE AND
COVERAGE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY: AND MAKING TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.

j
I
j
I
\
!
I

THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
AMENDS:
63-30-4. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 129.
LAWS OF UTAH 1983
63-30-3. AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 139. LAWS
OF UTAH 1965
63-30-9. AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 139. LAWS
OF UTAH 1965
63-30-10. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS
15 AND 319, LAWS OF UTAH 1990
63-30-10.5, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 75.
LAWS OF UTAH 1987
63-30-11. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 75.
LAWS OF UTAH 1987
63-30-33. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER
220. LAWS OF UTAH 1989
63-30-34. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 75.
LAWS OF UTAH 1987
63-30-36. AS LAST .AMENDED BY CHAPTER 30.
LAWS OF UTAH 1987
REPEALS:
63-30-7. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 204.
LAWS OF UTAH 1990
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 63-30-4. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as
last amended by Chapter 129. Laws of Utah 1983, is
amended to read:
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect of
waiver of immunity — Exclusive remedy —
Joinder of employee — Limitations on personal liability.
\ 1) _| a_> Nothing contained in this chapter, unless
specifically provided, [shall] may be construed as an
admission or denial of liability or responsibility [m
so far ag) by or for governmental entities or their employees [are concerned i.
<b> If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted, and liability of the
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person.
(c > No cause of action or basis of liability is created
by any waiver of immunity in this chapter, nor may
any provision of this chapter be construed as imposing strict liability or absolute liability.

1

b • A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other
civil action or proceeding [by reason of] based upon
the same subject matter against the employee or the
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave
rise to the claim, unless:
•jj the employee acted or failed to act through
fraud or malices j; or
•' ii' the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth in Subsection 63-30-36 !3)'c;.
' 41 An employee may be joined in an action against
a governmental entity in a representative capacity
if the act or omission complained of is one for which
the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, unless it is established that
the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or
malice.
Section 2. Section Amended.
Section 63-30-8. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
enacted by Chapter 139. Laws of Utah 1965, is
amended to read:
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous
condition of highways, bridges, or other
structures.
[Immunity] Unless the injury arises out of one or
more of the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section
63-30-10. immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert,
tunnel, bridge, viaduct, o*> other structure located
[thereon] on them.
Section 3. Section Amended.
Section 63-30-9. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
enacted by Chapter 139. Laws of Utah 1965. is
amended to read:
63-30-9, Waiver of immunity for injury from
dangerous or defective public building,
structure, or other public improvement —
Exception.
[Immunity] Unless the injury arises out of one or
more of the exceptions to waiver set forth in Section
63-30-10. immunity from suit of all governmental
entities is waived for any injury caused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building,
structure, dam. reservoir, or other public improve-
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Ch. 76

< 15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while
being driven in accordance with the requirements of
Section 41-6-14:
Section 4. Section Amended.
Section 63-30-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953. as
last amended by Chapters 15 and 319. Laws of Utah
1990. is amended to read:

j
I
|

< 16 > a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk,
sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other
structure located on them:

63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury
caused by negligent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.

j
j
!

' 17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement: or

Immunity from suit of all governmental entities
is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed within the scope of employment except if the injury
arises out of:

j
j
!

[«4M <_18_) the activities of:
'ai providing emergency medical assistance:
•b> fighting fire:

j

< c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous
f 1) the exercise or performance or the failure to ex- I materials or hazardous wastes:
ercise or perform a discretionary function, whether I
!
d) emergency evacuations: or
or not the discretion is abused:
j
<e» intervening during dam emergencies.
• 2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false ar- !
rest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass,
abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference
with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or
violation of civil
rights:

j

Section 5. Section Amended.

!
j
i

Section 63-30-10.5. Utah Code Annotated 1953.
as enacted by Chapter 75. Laws of Utah 1987. is
amended to read:

(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation
of or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend,
or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval.
order, or similar authorization;

I
j

63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking
private property without compensation.

(4' a failure to make an inspection or by making an
inadequate or negligent inspection [of anv proper-

j
j

*];

j

'

(1) [Immunity] As provided by Article I. Section 22
of the Utah Constitution, immunity from suit of all
governmental entities is waived for the recovery of
compensation from the governmental entity when
the governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public uses without just compensation.

15 • the institution or prosecution of any judicial or
administrative proceeding, even if malicious or ;
without probable cause:
|

(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed
according to the requirements of Chapter 34. Title
78. Eminent Domain.

<6» a misrepresentation by [the] an employee
whether or not it is negligent or intentional:

!
j

|

Section 6. Section Amended.

•7> or results from riots, unlawful assemblies,
public demonstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances:

j
!

Section 63-30-11. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as
last amended by Chapter 75, Laws of Utah 1987. is
amended to read:

< 8 • or in connection with the collection of and i 63-30-11. Claim for injury — Notice — Conassessment of taxes:
j
tents — Service — Legal disability.
'• 9 • the activities of the Utah National Guard:
' 101 the incarceration of any person in any state
prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal confmement:
11 any natural condition on [stato lands] publicly owned or controlled lands, any condition existing
in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation. or [aj the reiult of] any activity authorized
by the Board of State Lands and Forestry:
• 12' research or implementation of cloud managemem or seeding for the clearing of fog: for I

j
i
j
|
<
!
\
:
\
j
j
!
j

(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a
governmental entity, or against an employee for an
act or omission occurring during the performance of
his duties, within the scope of employment, or under
color of authority shall file a written notice of claim
with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving r:se to
the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3) < a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
M > a brief statement of the facts:

'13' the management of flood waters, earth- j
quakes, or natural disasters:
>
• 14 • the construction, repair, or operation of flood
<"• jtorm svstt*ms:
:

(ii > the nature of the claim asserted: and
!

!
j

< 1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations
that would apply if the claim were against a private
person begins to run.

mi»the damages incurred by the claimant so far
as they are known.

Ch.76
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<b) The notice of claim shall be:

j

(i) signed by the person making the claim or that
peTson's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardiani;j;and IshftH-feei

j
i
!

«ii) directed and delivered to the responsible governrnental entity according to the requirements of
Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13.

]
j

(4) < a»If the claimant is under the age of majority,
or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian fref4fftp«sefted] at the time the claim arises, the
claimant may apply to the court to extend the time
for service of notice of claim.
< b M i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, the court may extend the time for service
of notice of claim.
<• ii' The court may not grant an extension that exceeds the applicable statute of limitations.

Section 8. Section Amended.
Section 63-30-34. Utah Code Annotated 1953}
last amended by Chapter 75. Laws of Utah 198$
amended to read:
63-30-34. Limitation of judgments against
governmental entity or employee — Insuft
ance coverage exception.
11) i a) Except as provided in Subsection (*£*] <2>j[
a judgment for damages for personal injury agauigf
a governmental entity, or an employee whom a gov.
ernmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceedi
$250,000 for one person in any one occurrence, c*
S500.000 for two or more persons in any one occur,
rence. the court shall reduce the judgment to thai
amountUJ.
(b) A court may not award judgment of more thai
$250.000 for injury or death to one person regard
less of whether or not the function giving rise to thi
injury is characterized as governmental.
[<-2->] j£) Except as provided in Subsection [l&] (2),
if a judgment for property damage against a governmental entity, or an employee whom a governmental entity has a duty to indemnify, exceeds $100,000
in any one occurrence, the court shall reduce the
judgment to that amount, regardless of whether or
not the function giving rise to the damage is characterized as governmental.

1

c> In determining whether or not to grant an extension, the court shall consider whether the delay
in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining "its
defense on the merits.
Section 7. Section Amended.
Section 63-30-33, Utah Code Annotated 1953. as
last amended by Chapter 220. Laws of Utah 1989, is
amended to read:

[f34] (2!) The damage limits established in this section do not apply to damages awarded as compensation when a governmental entity has taken or damaged private property for public use without just
compensation.

63-30-33. Liability insurance — Insurance
for employees authorized — No right to
indemnification or contribution from governmental agency.

Section 9. Section Amended.
Section 63-30-36. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 30. Laws of Utah 1987, is
amended to read:

(1) (a) A governmental entity may insure any or all
of its employees against liability, in whole or in pan.
for injury or damage resulting from an act or omission occurring during the performance of an employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, regardless of whether or
not that entity is immune from suit for that act or
omission.

63-30-36. Defending government employee
— Request — Cooperation — Payment of
judgment.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections « 2 > and (3), a
governmental entity shall defend any action
brought against its employee arising from an act or
omission occurring:

<b> Any expenditure for that insurance is for a
public purpose.

iaj during the performance of the employee's duties:

c* Under any contract or policy of insurance [exccuted under authority of this section,] providing
coverage on behalf of a governmental entity or employee for any liability defined by this section, regardless of the source of funding for the coverage.
the insurer has no right to indemnification or contribution from the governmental entity or its employee
[with respect to] for any loss or liability covered by
the contract or policy.

•b; within the sco^e of the employee's employment; or
'Ci under color of authority.
•2Ma) Before a governmental entity may defend
its employee against a claim, the employee shall
make a written request to the governmental entity
to defend him:
<i» within ten days after service of process upon
him: or

121 Any surety covering a governmental entity or
its employee under any faithful performance surety
bond has no right to indemnification or contribution
from the governmental entity or its employee [with
respect to] for any loss covered by that bond based on
any act or omission for which the governmental entity would be obligated to defend or indemnify under
the provisions of Section 63-30-36.

' ii»within a longer period that would not prejudice
the governmental entity in maintaining a defense
on his behalf; or
<iii> within a period that would not conflict with
notice requirements imposed on the entity in con232

miction with insurance earned by the entity relat- I pay a judgment, if the conditions set forth in Subseci tion < 3) are established.
Lg to the risk involved.
pftjdfthe employee fails to make a request, or fails J
L, reasonably cooperate in the defense, the governmental entity need not defend or continue to defend !
fcfce employee, nor pay any judgment, compromise.
E»settlement against the employee in respect to the

• 7 H a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30-37
affects the obligation of a governmental entity to
provide insurance coverage according to the requirements of Subsection 41-12a-301 «3« and Section 63-30-29.5.

'bi}A] When a governmental entity 'may refuse!
(31 The governmental entity may decline to de- 1 declines to defend, or declines to continue to defend.
ifend. or subject to any court rule or order, decline to ! an action against its employee under the conditions
Continue to defend, an action against an employee if ; set forth in Subsection 13 >, [b«] it shall still provide
coverage up to the amount specified in Sections
gj"3etermines:
31A-22-304 and 63-30-29.5.
(a) that the act or omission in question did not occur:
; Section 10. Repealer.
(i» during the performance of the employees duties; let]
(ii) within the scope of his employment: or
i

(iii) under color of authority; [er]

;

Section 11. Informational Section.

(bi that the injury or damage resulted from the
fraud or malice of the employee: or
(CJ that the injury or damage on which the claim
was based resulted from:

•

(i) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical control of a vehicle:
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or greater
by weight than the established legal limit; [er]

j

(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any
drug to a degree that rendered the person incapable
of safely driving the vehicle; or

j
,

(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol
and any drug to a degree that rendered the person
incapable of safely driving the vehicle: or

Section 63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury
from negligent operation of motor vehicles — Exception. Utah Code Annotated 1953. as last
amended by Chapter 204. Laws of Utah 1990. is repealed.

'

(ii) the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be unable to reasonably perform his
job function because of the use of alcohol, because of
the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as
defined in Section 58-37-4. or because of the combined influence of alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled substance as defined by Section 56-37-4.
»4> (a> Within ten days of receiving a written request to defend an employee, the governmental entity shall inform the employee whether or not it
shall provide a defense, and, if it refuses to provide a
defense, the basis for its refusal.
<b> A refusal by the entity to provide a defense
Iskatt] is not [be] admissible for any purpose in the
action in which the employee is a defendant.
. 5 - itfj Except as provided in Subsection '6'. if a
governmental entity conducts the defense of an employee, the governmental entity shall pay any judgment based upon the claim!. or any compromise or
settlement of the claim, except as provided-m- St*e~
seetion '6»1.
«6i A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee under (an agreement with the
employee thatl a reservation of right> under which
the governmental entity reserve? the ri«:hi not to
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This act has prospective effect only and any
changes to the law caused by this act do not apply to
any claims based upon injuries or losses that occurred before the effective date of this act.

ADDENDUM B

KANSAS STATUTES ANNOTATED
COPR. (c) 1990 By the Revisor of Statutes of Kansas
CHAPTER 8. AUTOMOBILES AND OTHER VEHICLES
ARTICLE 15. UNIFORM ACT REGULATING TRAFFIC; RULES OF THE ROAD
OBEDIENCE TO AND EFFECT OF TRAFFIC LAWS
06. Authorized emergency vehicles; rights, duties and liability of drivers
tereof.
The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an
•gency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the
or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may
:cise the privileges set forth in this section, but subject to the
litions herein stated.
The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
Park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this article;
Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing
l as may be necessary for safe operation;
i Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as such driver does not endanger
> or property;
i Disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning in
rified directions; and
i Proceed through toll booths on roads or bridges without stopping for
lent of tolls, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe
ration and the picking up or returning of toll cards.
The exemptions herein granted to an authorized emergency vehicle shall
.y only when such vehicle is making use of an audible signal meeting the
lirements of K.S.A. 8-1738 and visual signals meeting the requirements of
A. 8-1720, except that an authorized emergency vehicle operated as a police
.cle need not be equipped with or display a red light visible from in front
:he vehicle.
The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized
:gency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all
;ons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of
:less disregard for the safety of others.
:ory: L. 1974, ch. 33, s 8-1506; L. 1977, ch. 43, s 1; July 1.

41-6-14. Emergency vehicles — Applicability of traffic law
to highway work vehicles — ExemptionsCD The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to
an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of
the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may
exercise the privileges under this section, subject to Subsection (2).
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may:
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter;
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing
down as may be necessary for safe operation;
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits if the operator does not endanger
life or property; or
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning
in specified directions.
(3) Privileges granted under this section to an authorized emergency vehicle apply only when the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section
41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is
visible from in front of the vehicle.
(a) The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with
regard for the safety of all persons, or protect the operatorfromthe consequences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges.
(b) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this chapter
does not apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other equipment while
actually engaged in work upon the surface of a highway. However, the
entire chapter applies to those persons and vehicles when traveling to or
from the work.

ADDENDUM C

Laws of U t a h - 1 9 9 0
CHAPTER 204
S. B. No. 194
Pa^ed February 19, 1990
Approved March 12. 1990
Effective April 23, 1990
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR
DAMAGES OF POLICE PURSUED VEHICLE
By Richard J, Cariing
AN ACT RELATING TO GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY; PRESERVING GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY FOR PEACE OFFICERS DRIVING MOTOR VEHICLES EN PURSUIT OF
ACTUAL OR SUSPECTED VIOLATORS OF
THE LAW: AiND MAKING TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.
THIS ACT .AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
AMENDS:
63-30-7. AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 129,
LAWS OF UTAH 1983
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 63-30-7. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 129, Laws of Utah 1983. :s
amended to read:
63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from
negligent operation of motor vehicles —
Exception.
(Dta) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or
other equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or under color
of authoritytr-pfovttiGQ. however. the*-*his-3eetk>tt
s4*t*m
(b) This subsection does not apply to the operation
of emergency venicies as defined by law and while
being driven in accordance with the requirements of
Section 41-6-14.
(2) ^a) All governmental entities employing peace
officers retain and do not waive immunity from liability for civil damages for personal injury or death
or for damage to property resulting from the collision of a vehicle being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, has been, or
believes he is being or has been pursued by a peace
otficer employea by the governmental entity in a
motor vehicle.
(b) Enactment of this subsection does not state nor
imply that this immunity was ever previously
waived or this liability specifically or implicitly recognized.

ADDENDUM D

gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions.
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused,
(2) assault, battery, false impnsonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or violation of
civil rights,
(3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or
refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate,
approval, order, or similar authorization,
(4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or
negligent inspection,
(5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause,
(6) a misrepresentation by an employee whether or not it is negligent
or intentional,
(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations,
mob violence, and civil disturbances,
(8) or m connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes,
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard,
(10) the incarceration of any person m any state prison, county or city
jail, or other place of legal confinement,
(11) any natural condition on publicly owned or controlled lands, any
condition existing in connection with an abandoned mine or mining operation, or any activity authorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry,
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for
the clearing of fog,
(13) the management of flood waters, earthquakes, or natural disasters,
(14) the construction, repair, or operation of flood or storm systems,
(15) the operation of an emergency vehicle, while being driven m accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14,
(16) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any highway,
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bndge, viaduct,
or other structure located on them,
(17) a latent dangerous or latent defective condition of any public
building, structure, dam, reservoir, or other public improvement, or
(18) the activities of
(a) providing emergency medical assistance,
(b) fighting fire,
(c) regulating, mitigating, or handling hazardous materials or hazardous wastes,
(d) emergency evacuations, or
(e) intervening dunng dam emergencies
History: L. 1965, ch 139, § 10; 1975, ch.
194, § 11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1;
1989, ch. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989,
ch. 268, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch.
319, §§ 1, 2; 1991, ch. 76, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment by ch 15, effective July 1, 1990, deleted
the subsection designation (1) from the beginning of the section, redesignated former Subsections (l)(a) to (1)(1) as Subsections (1) to (13)
and made related changes, and deleted former
Subsection (2), waiving immunity from suit for
violation of Fourth Amendment rights and
making the provisions of Chapter 16 of Title 78
the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by
such violations
The 1990 amendment by ch 319, effective

Julv 1 loon
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1991 added Subsections (13) through (17) and
redesignated former Subsection (13) as present
Subsection (18), inserted "violation or before
"civil rights" in Subsection (2), deleted "of any
property" following "inspection" m Subsection
(4), made minor stylistic changes m Subsections (6) and (12) and rewrote Subsection (11),
which read "anv natural condition on state
lands or as the result of any activity authorized
by the Board of State Lands and Forestry "
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1991, ch 76,
which amended this section and §§ 63-30-4,
63-30-8,63-30-9 63-30-10 5 63-30-11,63-3033, 63-30-34, and 63 30-36, provides m § 11
that 'This act has prospective effect only and
any changes to the law caused by this act do

